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Abstract
It has long been known that in the usual black-box model, one cannot get super-polynomial
quantum speedups without some promise on the inputs. In this paper, we examine certain types
of symmetric promises, and show that they also cannot give rise to super-polynomial quantum
speedups. We conclude that exponential quantum speedups only occur given “structured”
promises on the input.
Specifically, we show that there is a polynomial relationship of degree 12 between D(f) and
Q(f) for any function f defined on permutations (elements of {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}n in which each
alphabet element occurs exactly once). We generalize this result to all functions f defined on
orbits of the symmetric group action Sn (which acts on an element of {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}n by
permuting its entries). We also show that when M is constant, any function f defined on a
“symmetric set” – one invariant under Sn – satisfies R(f) = O(Q(f)
12(M−1)).
1 Introduction
Quantum algorithms are generally believed to be able to solve certain problems super-polynomially
faster than any classical algorithm. One of the most famous examples of a problem for which a
super-polynomial speedup is expected is factoring: Shor’s algorithm can be used to factor an n-bit
integer in O(n3) time [8] while the best known classical algorithm is only conjectured to achieve
eO(n
1/3 log2/3 n) [5]. On the other hand, quantum computers are not believed to be able to solve
NP-complete problems in polynomial time. It seems that quantum computers can only provide
super-polynomial speedups for certain structured problems, but not for unstructured ones. What
type of structure is required? In this paper, we hope to help shed light on this problem.
1.1 Query Complexity Background
One common model for the study of quantum computation is the black-box model or query com-
plexity model. In this model, the input is provided by adaptive queries to a black box, each of
which reveals part of the input. The goal is to determine the value of some function f on this
input (where f is specified in advance), while minimizing the number of queries. More formally,
for a function f : [M ]n → {0, 1} (where [M ] := {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}), we consider an algorithm A that
makes adaptive queries to the entries of x ∈ [M ]n in order to determine f(x). The query complexity
achieved by A is defined to be the number of queries required by A over the worst-case choice of
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x. The query complexity of the function f is then defined to be the minimum query complexity
achieved by any algorithm A.
When the algorithm is deterministic, we denote the query complexity of f by D(f). When the
algorithm is randomized (but still determines f(x) with certainty), we denote it by R0(f). If a
randomized algorithm is allowed to make errors with bounded probability (say, less than 1/3), we
denote the query complexity by R(f). Finally, if the algorithm is allowed to make quantum queries
to the input (and is also allowed to err with bounded probability), we denote this measure by Q(f).
As expected, we have the relationship
D(f) ≥ R0(f) ≥ R(f) ≥ Q(f)
for every function f . For a nice survey of query complexity (also sometimes called decision-tree
complexity), see [6].
In the query complexity model, we can analyze the power of quantum computing by comparing
Q(f) to D(f) or R(f). An example of an unstructured search in this model is given by M = 2 and
f = ORn, the n-bit OR function. It’s not hard to see that R(f) = Ω(n). On the other hand, it has
been shown that Q(f) = Θ(
√
n) (the upper bound follows from Grover search [7], and the lower
bound was shown in [4]). While the quantum query complexity is asymptotically faster than the
classical query complexity, the gap is polynomial for this unstructured problem.
An example of exponential quantum speedup can be derived from Shor’s algorithm. However,
to do so, we must change the setting to allow for partial functions. In other words, we now let
f : X → {0, 1} be defined on a set X ⊆ [M ]n. We can then construct a function corresponding to a
problem called period-finding. We say x ∈ [M ]n is periodic with period s if xi = xj ⇐⇒ s|(i− j).
Let M = b√nc, and let X be the set of periodic inputs with period between 12
√
n and
√
n. Let
f(x) be 0 if the period of x is less than 34
√
n, and 1 otherwise. Then any classical algorithm will
require roughly
√
n queries, while Shor’s algorithm requires O(1).
Notice that in the period-finding problem f was defined as a partial function. We will call
the set X on which f is defined the promise of the problem. In this paper, we will examine the
structure of promises that can or cannot result in super-polynomial quantum speedups.
1.2 Previous Work
In 1998, Beals, Buhrman, Cleve, Mosca, and de Wolf [3] showed the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, then Q(f) = Ω(D(f)1/6).
Their result easily extends to larger alphabets:
Theorem 2 If f : [M ]n → {0, 1}, then Q(f) = Ω(D(f)1/6).
This tells us that there is never a super-polynomial quantum speedup for total functions. In
fact, it is conjectured that the relationship between D(f) and Q(f) is at most quadratic, so that
the OR function gives the largest gap:
Conjecture 3 If f : [M ]n → {0, 1}, then Q(f) = Ω(D(f)1/2).
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Note that these results compare quantum query complexity to deterministic query complexity
(instead of randomized). For more information, see [6].
Another important result was proved by Aaronson and Ambainis in 2009 [1]. They defined a
function f to be permutation-invariant if
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = f(τ(xσ(1)), τ(xσ(2)), . . . , τ(xσ(n)))
for all inputs x and all permutations σ ∈ Sn and τ ∈ SM . Here f may be a partial function, but
the promise set X on which f is defined must itself be invariant under these permutations. As an
example, if M = 2, then X might contain all binary strings of Hamming weight in {1, 2, n−2, n−1},
and f(x) will depend only on the Hamming weight of x (with the value of f being equal on Hamming
weights k and n− k).
Aaronson and Ambainis showed the following.
Theorem 4 If X ⊆ [M ]n is permutation invariant and f : X → {0, 1} is permutation invariant,
then Q(f) = Ω˜(R(f)1/7).
1.3 Our Results
To state our results, we first require the following definition.
Definition 5 Given x ∈ [M ]n, the type τ(x) of x is the multiset {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.
Given a type T of some x ∈ [M ]n, we define Tˆ to be subset of [M ]n consisting of all inputs of
type T . Abusing notation, we will often write T instead of Tˆ to denote the set of inputs of a fixed
type.
For example, the type of x = (1, 1, 2) is the multiset {1, 1, 2}, so that (1, 1, 2) and (1, 2, 1) have
the same type. One way of thinking about this definition is as follows. Consider the group action
Sn that acts on [M ]
n by permuting the indices of each element x ∈ [M ]n. Then a type is simply
an orbit of this group action.
Our first result is the following theorem.
Theorem 6 If f : T → {0, 1} is a partial function whose promise is a type, then
Q(f) = Ω
(
D(f)1/12
)
.
Note that this is a relationship between quantum query complexity and deterministic (not
randomized) query complexity. In this sense, the result is similar to Theorem 2, and indeed we use
some similar tools in its proof.
Our second result extends the previous theorem from promises that are orbits of the group
action to promises that are any invariant subset for the group action; that is, the promise may be
any “symmetric” set. Unfortunately, here we are only able to prove a polynomial relationship when
M is constant.
Theorem 7 Let M be constant. If f : X → {0, 1} is a partial function on any symmetric promise
X ∈ [M ] (that is, a set X satisfying x ∈ X,σ ∈ Sn ⇒ xσ ∈ X where xσ := (xσ(1), xσ(2), . . . , xσ(n)))
then
Q(f) = Ω
(
R(f)1/(12(M−1))
)
.
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In particular, when M = 2, we have
Q(f) = Ω
(
R(f)1/12
)
.
Unlike the previous theorem, this one only relates quantum query complexity to randomized
(rather than deterministic) query complexity. This is necessary; indeed, if X is the set of binary
strings of Hamming weight 0 or bn/2c and f is defined to be 0 on 0n and 1 elsewhere, then
D(f) = bn/2c+ 1 but R(f) is constant.
Notice that this last theorem applies even to the promise X = [M ]n (for constant M), so it
can be viewed as a generalization of Theorem 1 (although our polynomial relationship has higher
degree, and our generalization replaces D(f) with R(f)).
As a final note, we remark that our results are mostly incomparable with the Aaronson-Ambainis
result (Theorem 4). When M is constant, our Theorem 7 is much more general (since it doesn’t
place restrictions on the function). However, when M is constant, Theorem 4 is not very difficult
in the first place; most of the work in [1] went towards dealing with the fact that M may be large.
In the following section, we will prove Theorem 6. Theorem 7 will be proven in section 3, and
section 4 will discuss open problems and directions for future research.
2 Type Promises
In this section, we show that the deterministic and quantum query complexity measures are poly-
nomially related when the promise is exactly a type, proving Theorem 6.
One particular case of interest, which will motivate a lot of our analysis, is the case where
M = n and T is the type corresponding to the multiset {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} (i.e. the case where the
inputs are all permutations), together with the function f satisfying f(x) = 0 iff 0 occurs in the
first bn2 c entries of x. This function is sometimes called the permutation inversion problem.
2.1 Sensitivity, Block Sensitivity, and Certificate
Complexity
We start by defining and examining sensitivity, block sensitivity, and certificate complexity in the
promise setting. The behavior of these complexity measures is similar on type promises to the
behavior for total boolean functions (a survey of which can be found in [6]), with the exception
that all three of these measures might be much smaller than the deterministic query complexity
(an example of this is given by the permutation inversion problem).
We start by defining certificates.
Definition 8 Let x ∈ [M ]n. A partial assignment c is an element of ([M ] ∪ ∗)n. c is said to be
consistent with x if for all i = 1, 2, . . . n, either ci = xi or ci = ∗.
Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ]n. c is a 0-certificate for f if f(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X consistent
with c. Analogously, c is a 1-certificate for f if f(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X consistent with c. c is a
certificate if it is a 0- or 1-certificate.
We can now define the complexity measures C(f), bs(f), and s(f).
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Definition 9 Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ], and let x ∈ X. The certificate complexity Cx(f)
of x is the minimum size of a certificate c for f consistent with x.
The certificate complexity C(f) of f is the maximum value of Cx(f) out of all x ∈ X.
Definition 10 Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ], and let x ∈ X. The block sensitivity bsx(f) of x
is the maximum size of a collection of disjoint set of indices b1, b2, · · · ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} (called blocks)
such that for each block bi, there is some y ∈ X that disagrees with x only on indices in bi and for
which f(y) 6= f(x).
The block sensitivity bs(f) of f is the maximum value of bsx(f) out of all x ∈ X.
Sensitivity translates somewhat less well into the promise setting. We give the following defini-
tion for it, which makes sense primarily when the promise is a type promise.
Definition 11 Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ], and let x ∈ X. The sensitivity sx(f) of x the
maximum block sensitivity of x where the blocks all have size 2.
The sensitivity s(f) of f is the maximum value of sx(f) out of all x ∈ X.
Note that if we instead required the blocks to have size 1, then under a type promise the
sensitivity of a function will always be zero, since changing a single entry only will always break
the promise. Letting blocks have size 2 allows two entries to be swapped, maintaining the type
promise.
We now show some relationships between Q(f), R(f), C(f), bs(f), and s(f) analogous to the
ones found in [6].
Theorem 12 For all f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ], R(f) = Ω(bs(f)) and Q(f) = Ω(√bs(f)).
Proof. The proof follows by a reduction from Grover search. Let x be such that bs(f) = bsx(f),
and let b1, b2, . . . , bbs(f) be disjoint sensitive blocks of x. Consider the input x and the bs(f) inputs
given by changing a sensitive block of x. To decide the value of f on such inputs, an algorithm
must decide whether the input is x or whether one of the blocks has been flipped; this is the setting
for Grover search. If a block was flipped, a randomized algorithm must query at least one input
from it; but this takes Ω(bs(f)) queries to find. The lower bound for Q(f) follows from a simple
application of Ambainis’s adversary method, as for the Grover search problem. 
Theorem 13 For all f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ], s(f) ≤ bs(f) ≤ C(f).
Proof. s(f) ≤ bs(f) follows immediately from the definition. Since a certificate must include at
least one entry from every sensitive block, we get bsx(f) ≤ Cx(f) for all x ∈ X, so bs(f) ≤ C(f).

Theorem 14 For all f : T → {0, 1} with T ⊆ [M ] a type, we have C(f) ≤ 3bs(f)s(f).
Proof. Let x be of type T . Let b1, b2, . . . , bbsx(f) be disjoint sensitive blocks of x, and assume each
bi is minimal (under subsets). Then
⋃
bi is a sub-certificate of x.
Now, we claim that the size of a sensitive block bi is at most 3s(f). This gives us the desired re-
sult, because we then have a certificate of size at most 3bsx(f)s(f), which means C(f) ≤ 3bs(f)s(f).
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Let y ∈ T disagree with x on bi with f(y) 6= f(x). Since x and y have the same type, the
difference between them must be a permutation on the entries of bi. In other words, there is some
permutation σ on bi such that for j ∈ bi, we have yj = xσ(j).
Consider the cycle decomposition c1c2 . . . ck of σ. Let cj = (a1, a2, . . . , am) be any such cycle.
We claim that switching as and as+1 for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m − 1} gives a sensitive block for y of size
2. Indeed, if this was not a sensitive block, then block bi would not be minimal, since (as, as+1)σ
would be a permutation corresponding to a smaller sensitive block (with as removed). Note that
the number of disjoint sensitive blocks of size 2 we can form this way is at least |bi|3 , since for each
cycle cj we can form b |cj |2 c ≥
|cj |
3 of them. Thus s(f) ≥ 13 |bi|, as desired. 
Corollary 15 Let f : T → {0, 1} with T ⊆ [M ] a type. Then R(f) = Ω(C(f)1/2) and Q(f) =
Ω(C(f)1/4).
Proof. We have C(f) ≤ 3bs(f)s(f) ≤ 3bs(f)2, so bs(f) = Ω(√C(f)). Combined with Theorem
12, this gives the desired result. 
2.2 The Structure of Small Certificates
The previous section showed a lower bound on quantum query complexity in terms of certificate
complexity on type promises. However, this result by itself cannot be used to relate quantum query
complexity to deterministic or randomized query complexities, because the certificate complexity
of a function on a type promise may be much smaller than the query complexities (an example
of this is given by the problem of inverting a permutation, in which the certificate complexity is
constant).
In this section, we prove the following technical lemma, which will be the main tool for han-
dling functions for which the certificate complexity is much smaller than the deterministic query
complexity.
Lemma 16 Let f : T → {0, 1} with T ⊆ [M ] a type. Fix any k ≤ 12
√
D(f). If k ≥ C(f), then
there is
• a partial assignment p, consistent with some input of type T , of size at most 4k2, and
• a set of alphabet elements S ⊆ [M ], of size at most 4k2, whose elements each occur less than
2k times in T outside of p
such that for any x ∈ T which is consistent with p and any sub-certificate c of x of size at most k,
at least one of the alphabet elements of c− p is in S.
(Note: by c− p, we mean the vector d with di = ci when pi = ∗ and di = ∗ otherwise.)
Intuitively, this lemma is saying that if we restrict to inputs consistent with p, then there is
a small subset S of the alphabet such that an element of S must exist in any small certificate.
For example, for the problem of inverting a permutation, we can choose p = ∅, S = {0}, and
k = bn/2c − 1; then any certificate of size less than k must include the alphabet element 0.
Our proof of this lemma is motivated by the proof that D(f) ≤ C(f)2 for total boolean functions
(that proof works by repeatedly examining consistent 0-certificates, each of which must reveal an
entry of each 1-certificate).
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Proof of lemma. Fix such T , f , and k. The proof is based on the following algorithm, which
either generates the desired p and S or else computes f(x) for a given input x. We will proceed by
arguing that the algorithm always generates p and S after at most 4k2 queries, which must happen
before it computes f(x) when x is the worst-case input (as guaranteed by the requirement that
k ≤ 12
√
D(f)). The algorithm is as follows.
1: Get input x
2: Set p = ∅, S = ∅, R = ∅
3: loop
4: Find any certificate c (in any legal input) that
• has size at most k
• is consistent with p
• has the property that c− p has no alphabet elements in S.
5: If there are no such certificates, output p and S and halt.
6: Add all the alphabet elements of c to R.
7: Set S to be the set of elements i of R whose multiplicity in T is less than 2k more than the
number of times i occurs in p.
8: Query all domain elements of c and add the results to p.
9: If p is a 0-certificate, output ”f(x) = 0” and halt; if it’s a 1-certificate, output ”f(x) = 1”
and halt.
We claim that this algorithm will go through the loop at most 4k times. Indeed, each iteration
through the loop selects a certificate. A 0-certificate must conflict with all 1-certificates, and vice
versa. There are two ways for certificates to conflict: either they disagree on the value of an entry,
or else there is some alphabet element i that they claim to find in different places (and in addition,
there must be few unrevealed instances of i in x).
This motivates the following definition: for a certificate c, let hp,S(c) be |c−p|+| alphabet(c)−S|
if c is consistent with p, and zero otherwise (here |c − p| denotes the number of non-∗ entries in
the partial assignment c − p, and alphabet(c) denotes the set of alphabet elements occurring in
c). Note that at the beginning of the algorithm, hp,S(c) ≤ 2|c| ≤ 2k for all certificates c of size at
most k. Now, whenever the algorithm considers a 0-certificate c0, the value of hp,S(c1) decreases
for all 1-certificates c1. This is because either c0 and c1 conflict on an input, in which case an
input is revealed, decreasing |c1 − p| (or contradicting c1), or else c0 and c1 both include a range
element i which has less than 2k occurrences left to be revealed according to T (if it had at least 2k
unrevealed occurrences, it wouldn’t be the source of a conflict between c0 and c1, since they each
have size at most k). In the latter case, i is added to S, which decreases | range(c1)− S|.
We have shown that each iteration of the algorithm decreases hp,S(c) either for all 0-certificates
or for all 1-certificates (of size at most k). This means that unless the loop is terminated, one of
the two values will reach 0 in less than 4k iterations. We claim this cannot happen, implying the
loop terminates in less than 4k iterations.
Without loss of generality, suppose by contradiction that hp,S(c) reaches 0 for all 0-certificates.
This means p is either a certificate - in which case the value of f(x) was determined, which is
a contradiction - or else p is not a certificate, and conflicts with all 0-certificates of size at most
k. In the latter case, there is some input y consistent with p such that f(y) = 0, and this input
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cannot have 0-sub-certificates of size at most k. Thus C(f) > k, contradicting the assumption in
the lemma.
This shows the loop always terminates in less than 4k iterations, which means it cannot calculate
f(x), and must instead output p and S. This gives the desired result, since all certificates of size
at most k that are consistent with p have the property that c− p has a range element in S. 
Note that if we restrict to inputs consistent with p, then the lemma asserts that finding a small
certificate requires finding an element of S. This gives us the following corollary:
Corollary 17 If f : T → {0, 1} with T ⊆ [M ] a type, then we have
R0(f) = Ω(min(D(f)
1/2, n1/4)) = Ω(D(f)1/4).
When M = n and T is the type of permutations, we have
R0(f) = Ω(min(D(f)
1/2, n1/3)) = Ω(D(f)1/3).
Proof. Fix T and f , and let k = bmin(12
√
D(f), 14n
1/4)c − 1 (in the case of permutations, let
k = bmin(12
√
D(f), 14n
1/3)c − 1). Since a zero-error randomized algorithm must find a certificate,
if k < C(f), the desired result follows. It remains to treat the case where k ≥ C(f).
In this case, let p and S be as in the lemma. We restrict to inputs consistent with p. Any zero-
error randomized algorithm must find a certificate on such inputs. Suppose by contradiction that
algorithm A has the property that on any such input, it requires at most k queries with probability
at least 12 .
In order to query at most k times, A would need to find a certificate of size at most k. But
this means that on all inputs x, A finds an element of S in x outside p with probability at least 12 .
However, there are at most 2k|S| = 8k3 such elements in the entries of x outside p (in the case of
permutations, at most |S| = 4k2 such elements), and the size of the domain is n−|p| ≥ n−4k2 ≥ n2 .
If x is generated by fixing p and permuting the remaining entries randomly, the chance of a query
finding an element of S is thus at most 16k
3
n , so by the union bound, the chance of finding such an
element after k queries is at most 16k
4
n (in the case of permutations, this becomes
8k3
n ). Choosing
k < 12n
1/4 (or k < 12n
1/3 in the case of permutations) gives the desired contradiction.
We conclude any zero-error randomized algorithm must make at least Ω(k) queries, which gives
the desired result. 
2.3 Lower bounds on R(f) and Q(f)
We now put everything together to prove lower bounds on R(f) and Q(f) in terms of D(f), proving
Theorem 6.
Theorem 18 For any f : T → {0, 1} with T ⊆ [M ]n a type, we have
R(f) = Ω(D(f)1/6)
and
Q(f) = Ω(D(f)1/12).
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(Note that unlike Corollary 17, we do not get an improvement here for the special case of
permutations.)
The proof of this theorem will require a version of Ambainis’s adversary method [2], which we
quote here for convenience.
Theorem 19 Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ]n. Let A,B ⊆ X be such that f(a) = 0 for all
a ∈ A and f(b) = 1 for all b ∈ B. Let R ⊆ A×B be such that
1. For each a ∈ A, there exist at least m different b ∈ B such that (a, b) ∈ R.
2. For each b ∈ B, there exist at least m′ different a ∈ A such that (a, b) ∈ R.
Let la,i be the number of b ∈ B such that (a, b) ∈ R and ai 6= bi. Let lb,i be the number of a ∈ A
such that (a, b) ∈ R and ai 6= bi. Let lmax be the maximum of la,ilb,i over all (a, b) ∈ R and
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that ai 6= bi. Then Q(f) = Ω
(√
mm′
lmax
)
.
Proof of Theorem 18. Apply Lemma 16 with k = 14
√
D(f). If C(f) > k, then we’re done by
Corollary 15. Otherwise, we get p and S from the lemma, with all certificates of size at most k
that are consistent with p having range elements in S.
We use Ambainis’s adversary method to get a lower bound for Q(f), which will look very similar
to the lower bound for permutation inversion found in [2]. In order to construct the sets for the
adversary method, we use the following procedure.
1: Set r = ∅.
2: while |r| ≤ k do
3: Pick any 0-certificate c consistent with p and r of size at most C(f).
4: Add the entries of c to r, but replace any alphabet element in S with an arbitrary
alphabet element in [M ]− S.
5: If |r| > k, stop. Otherwise, repeat steps 3 and 4 for a 1-certificate.
Note that r never contains alphabet elements in S. Thus as long as |r| ≤ k, the partial
assignment p ∪ r cannot be a certificate, by the lemma. This means the selection of certificates in
steps 3 and 5 cannot fail. Each iteration of the loop increases |r| by at most 2C(f), so this loop
repeats at least k2C(f) − 1 times.
Consider the subsets of r that were added by the selection of 0-certificates. Let them be
c
(0)
1 , c
(0)
2 , . . . , c
(0)
α , with α ≥ k2C(f)−1. Similarly, let the subsets of r that were added by 1-certificates
be c
(1)
1 , c
(1)
2 , . . . , c
(1)
α . Note that if some of the alphabet elements in c
(j)
i were replaced by some
elements from S, we would get a j-certificate. We use this fact to construct the sets for the
adversary method.
Let A be the multiset of alphabet elements of the selected certificates that are in S. Since the
total size of the certificates selected is |r| ≤ 2k, we have |A| ≤ 2k.
To each c
(j)
i , we add an arbitrary block of |A| entries outside p and r with alphabet elements
outside A. To be able to do this, we require that 2|A|α ≤ n − |r| − |p| − 2k|A| (the 2k|A| term
appears because each alphabet element in A may occur up to 2k times). Since |r|, |A| ≤ 2k and
|p| ≤ 4k2, it suffices to have α ≤ n−10k24k . Since k satisfies k ≤ 14
√
n, the right hand side is within a
constant factor of nk . We restrict α to this value if it was larger than it.
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Now we can place all the alphabet elements of S inside any c
(j)
i in a way that restores the
j-certificate. We can thus generate 2α inputs, α of which have value 0 and α of which have value 1,
such that the only difference between the inputs is which of the 2α disjoint bins have the alphabet
elements of S. This is essentially a version of permutation inversion.
It’s clear that a classical randomized algorithm must make Ω(α) queries, since it must find the
bin containing the alphabet elements of S. For the quantum lower bound, we use Theorem 19. Let
A be the set of indices in which the elements of S were placed for a 0-certificate bin, and let B be
the set of indices in which the elements of S were placed for a 1-certificate bin. Our relation R will
simply be A×B. Then each element of A has α neighbors in B, and vice versa. However, for each
domain entry q and (a, b) ∈ R, we have la,q = 1 or lb,q = 1, so la,qlb,q ≤ α. Thus we get a quantum
lower bound of Ω(
√
α).
Finally, to complete the proof, we note that α = Ω(min(nk ,
k
C(f))) = Ω(
k
C(f)) (since n > k
2),
so that, combining with corollary, R(f) = Ω(β) and Q(f) = Ω(
√
β) with β = max(
√
C(f), kC(f)).
Note that this satisfies β = Ω(k1/3). Picking k = 14
√
D(f) gives β = Ω(D(f)1/6), as desired. 
3 Symmetric Promises with Small Range
In this section, we show a polynomial relationship between Q(f) and R(f) for any function on a
symmetric promise whose range is constant, proving Theorem 7. We will use the term symmetric
to refer to invariance under permutation of the indices of the inputs.
3.1 The case of Symmetric Functions
We start by dealing with the case where the function f is itself symmetric. We prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 20 Let M be a constant, let X ⊆ [M ]n be symmetric, and let f : X → {0, 1} be a
symmetric function (so that f(x) depends only on the type of x.) Then
Q(f) = Ω
(
R(f)1/8
M log1/8M
)
.
In order to prove this theorem, we relate Q(f) and R(f) to a new complexity measure g(f),
which we now define.
Definition 21 If M is a constant and T1, T2 are types with range M , then the distance d(T1, T2)
between T1 and T2 is the maximum over all i ∈ [M ] of the difference between the multiplicity of i
in T1 and the multiplicity of i in T2.
If f : X → {0, 1} is a symmetric function with a symmetric promise X ⊆ [M ]n, define d(f) to
be the minimum value of d(T1, T2) for types T1, T2 ⊆ X that have different value under f . Define
g(f) := nd(f) .
We proceed to prove lemmas relating g(f) to R(f) and Q(f) to g(f).
Lemma 22 For any x ∈ [M ], O(n2 logM
d2
) queries suffice to find a type T such that d(T, τ(x)) < d
with probability at least 23 (where τ(x) denotes the type of x). Hence, if f : X → {0, 1} is symmetric,
then R(f) = O(g(f)2 logM).
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Proof. We describe a classical randomized algorithm for estimating the type of input x. The
algorithm is simply the basic sampling procedure that queries random entries of x and keeps track
of the number ri of times each range element i was observed. The type T is then formed by
T (i) = ri∑
i∈[M ] ri
n.
Let the type of x be τ(x) = (t1, t2, . . . , tM ), so that the multiplicity of range element i in τ(x)
is ti.
A version of the Chernoff bound states that if we have k ≥ 3
2
ln 2δ samples estimating the
proportion p of the population with some property, the proportion of the sample with that property
is in (p−, p+) with probability at least 1−δ. Setting  = dn and δ = 1− 13M , we see thatO(n
2 log(M)
d2
)
samples suffice for T (i)n to be within
d
n of
ti
n with probability at least 1 − 13M . In other words, we
have |T (i)− ti| < d with probability 1− 13M for each i.
The union bound then gives us |T (i)− ti| < d for all i with probability at least 23 . This shows
that d(T, τ(x)) < d, as desired.
To compute f(x) for symmetric f , a randomized algorithm can estimate the type of x to within
d(f)
2 , and then just output the value of f on any input of type within
d(f)
2 of the estimated type T .
Since g(f) = nd(f) , we get R(f) = O(g(f)
2 logM). 
Lemma 23 If f : X → {0, 1} is symmetric with a symmetric promise X ⊆ [M ]n, then
Q(f) = Ω
(
g(f)1/4
M
)
.
Proof. Let S and T be types with distance d(f) such that if x has type S and y has type T then
f(x) 6= f(y). We claim that a quantum algorithm cannot distinguish between these types in less
than the desired number of queries.
We proceed by a hybrid argument. We form a sequence of types {Si}ki=0 with k ≤M such that
S0 = S, Sk = T , and for all i = 0, 1, . . . , k− 1, the types Si and Si+1 differ in the multiplicity of at
most 2 range elements and have distance at most d(f).
We do this as follows. Set S0 = S. Let A be the set of range elements on whose multiplicities
the current Si agrees with T ; at the beginning, A is the set of range elements on which S and T
have the same multiplicity, which may be empty. To construct Si+1 given Si, we simply pick a
range element r for which Si has a larger multiplicity than T and a range element r
′ for which Si
has a smaller multiplicity than T . We then set Si+1 to have the same multiplicities as Si, except
that the multiplicity of r is reduced to that in T and the multiplicity of r′ is increased to make
up the difference. Note that the multiplicity of r is then equal in Si and T , so r gets added to A.
Moreover, note that d(Si, Si+1) ≤ d(Si, T ), and also d(Si+1, T ) ≤ d(Si, T ). Since this is true for all
i, it follows that d(Si, Si+1) ≤ d(S, T ) = d(f).
Since a range element gets added to A each time and these elements are never removed, this
procedure is terminated with Sk = T after at most M steps. Thus k ≤M . In addition, consecutive
types differ in the multiplicities of 2 elements and have distance at most d(f).
We now give a lower bound on the quantum query complexity of distinguishing Si from Si+1.
Without loss of generality, let the range elements for which Si and Si+1 differ be 0 and 1, with 0
having a smaller multiplicity in Si. Let a be the multiplicity of 0 in Si, and let b be the multiplicity
of 1 in Si, with 0 < b− a ≤ d(f). Let c and d be the multiplicities of 0 and 1 in Si+1, respectively.
Then c+ d = a+ b. Let e = a+ b = c+ d.
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We prove two lower bounds using Ambainis’s adversary method, corresponding to e being
either large or small. For the small case, consider an input x of type Si split into 2α = bne c blocks
B1, B2, . . . , B2α of size e each, such that all the 0 and 1 elements lie in block B1. To change the
input from type Si to Si+1, we must simply change the first block. Also, note that rearranging the
blocks does not change the type. Let X be the set of inputs given by rearranging the blocks of x
so that the block B1 ends up in the first α blocks, and let Y be the set of inputs given by replacing
B1 to get type Si+1 and then rearranging the blocks so that B1 ends up in the last α blocks. We
now have a reduction from the problem of inverting a permutation, so using Ambainis’s adversary
method, we get a lower bound of Ω(
√
α) = Ω(
√
n
e ).
For the case when e is large, we restrict to inputs in which all elements are fixed except for
those that have value 0 or 1. The lower bound of Ω(
√
e
d(f)) then follows from Lemma 22 in [1].
If e ≤√nd(f), the former bound gives a lower bound of Ω(( nd(f))1/4) for distinguishing Si from
Si+1 by quantum queries. If e ≥
√
nd(f), the latter bound gives the same. Thus we have a lower
bound of Ω(g(f)1/4) in all cases.
Finally, note that if a quantum algorithm could compute f(x) in Q(f) queries, then for some i
it could distinguish Si from Si+1 with probability Ω(
1
M ). This means we could use MQ(f) queries
to distinguish Si from Si+1 with constant probability, so Q(f) = Ω(
1
M g(f)
1/4). 
These two lemmas combine to prove Theorem 20, which can be restated as the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 24 For symmetric f on alphabet of size M , we have
R(f) = O(Q(f)8M8 logM).
3.2 The General Case
In this section, we prove Theorem 7. The proof proceeds by describing a classical algorithm that
doesn’t use too many more queries than the best quantum algorithm. An interesting observation is
that this classical algorithm is mostly deterministic, and uses only O(Q(f)8M8 logM) randomized
queries at the beginning (in order to estimate the type of the input).
Proof. Let f be a function. We describe a classical algorithm for computing f on an input x, and
argue that a quantum algorithm cannot do much better.
As a first step, the algorithm will estimate the type of x using O(Q(f)8M8 logM) queries. By
lemma 22, this will provide a type T such that d(T, τ(x)) < n
cM4Q(f)4
with high probability, where
we choose the constant c to be larger than twice the asymptotic constant in Lemma 23. We restrict
our attention to types that are within n
cM4Q(f)4
of T .
For this proof, we will often deal with certificates c for f that only work on inputs of some
specific type S; that is, all inputs x ∈ X of type S that are consistent with c have the same value
under f . We will say c is a certificate for the type S.
Now, notice that if we fix a type S and assume that x has this type, then there is a deterministic
algorithm that determines the value of f(x) in at most α steps, where α = O(Q(f)12). Since this
is a deterministic algorithm, it must find a certificate of size at most α for the type S. The only
other possibility is that the deterministic algorithm finds a partial assignment that contradicts the
type S, in which case it cannot proceed. Running this deterministic algorithm on type S will be
called examining S.
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Note further that we can never find a 0-certificate c0 for some type S0 and a 1-certificate c1
for some other type S1 without the certificates contradicting either type. This is because if we
found such certificates, then fixing those entries and shuffling the rest according to either S0 or S1
will give two types S0 − (c0 ∪ c1) and S1 − (c0 ∪ c1) on inputs of size n − |c0 ∪ c1| with distance
at most n
cM4Q(f)4
that the quantum algorithm must distinguish between. Since n > 4α (or else
R(f) = O(n) = O(Q(f)12)), we have n−|c0∪c1| > n2 , and (n2 )/( ncM4Q(f)4 ) = cM
4Q(f)4
2 ; then Lemma
23 together with the choice of c imply that a quantum algorithm takes more than Q(f) queries to
distinguish these types, giving a contradiction.
For a type S, we now define v(S) ∈ [2α + 1]M to be the vector with v(S)i = min(S(i), 2α) for
all i, where S(i) is the multiplicity of i in the type S. If an input has type S, we call v(S) the
simplified type of the input. We consider the partial order on simplified types given by v(S) ≥ v(R)
if and only if v(S)i ≥ v(R)i for all i = 1, 2, . . .M . We say a simplified type v(S) is maximal if it is
maximal in this partial order.
The algorithm proceeds by finding the set of maximal simplified types, and selecting a repre-
sentative type S for each maximal simplified type v so that v(S) = v. Let the types selected this
way be S1, S2, . . . , Sβ. For each Si, we then run the deterministic algorithm that uses α queries
assuming type Si. Let ci be the set of queries made by this algorithm for type Si. Note that the
total number of queries made this way is at most αβ.
For each Si, the partial assignment ci is either a certificate for Si or a disproof of the type Si.
Consider the pairwise unions ci ∪ cj . We restrict our attention to the types Si that are consistent
with ci ∪ cj for all j. We claim that there is at least one such type. Indeed, if T is the true type of
the input, then v ≥ v(T ) for some maximal simplified type v, and v(Sk) = v for some k. Then Sk
cannot be disproven in 2α queries, as that would disprove v and therefore v(T ) as well.
Now, let Si and Sj be any two types remaining. Then they are both consistent with ci ∪ cj . As
we saw earlier, we cannot have ci be a 0-certificate for Si and cj be a 1-certificate for Sj (or vice
versa); the certificates ci and cj must agree. We conclude that the certificates ci for the remaining
types are either all 0-certificates (for their respective types) or all 1-certificates. Our algorithm will
then output 0 in the former case and 1 in the latter.
To see that the algorithm is correct, recall that Sk is one of the remaining types, with v(Sk) =
v ≥ v(T ). Without loss of generality, suppose the algorithm output 0, so that ck is a 0-certificate.
Suppose by contradiction that f(x) = 1 for the our input. Let c be a 1-certificate consistent with
x of size at most α. Then c is a 1-certificate for the type T . Now, c ∪ ck cannot disprove v(T )
(since it has size at most 2α), so c∪ ck cannot disprove T . Since c∪ ck cannot disprove v(T ), it also
cannot disprove v, so it cannot disprove Sk. This means T and Sk are not disproven by their 0-
and 1-certificates, which we’ve shown is a contradiction. Thus if the algorithm outputs 0, we must
have f(0) as well.
The total number of queries required is O(Q(f)8M8 logM) + αβ, where α = O(Q(f)12). We
must estimate β, the number of maximal simplified types. This is at most the number of maximal
elements in [2α+1]M in our partial order. We can show by induction that this is at most (2α+1)M−1:
in the base case of M = 1, the value is 1, and when M increases by 1 the number of maximal
elements can increase by at most a factor of (2α+ 1). This gives a final bound of O(Q(f)12M ) on
the number of queries when M is constant.
To reduce this to O(Q(f)12(M−1)), we note that some alphabet element a must occur at least
n/M times in T , by the pigeonhole principle. We could then use O(Mα) queries to find 2α instances
of a with high probability. Then each simplified type v will have va = 2α, so the simplified types
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are effectively elements of [2α + 1]M−1 instead of [2α + 1]M . This decreases β to (2α + 1)M−2, so
the total number of queries decreases to O(Q(f)12(M−1)).

4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that certain types of promises do not suffice for quantum speedups.
These promises are highly symmetric; we could say that they lack structure that a quantum algo-
rithm could exploit.
One natural question is whether we could expand these results to symmetric promises with
large alphabets. Such a result would generalize the result of Aaronson and Ambainis (Theorem 4).
Proving such a theorem seems tricky; in fact, even the case of symmetric functions with symmetric
promises was left as a conjecture in Aaronson and Ambainis [1].
One observation is that Aaronson and Ambainis managed to overcome the difficulties posed by
a large alphabet by requiring a symmetry on the alphabet elements as well. Perhaps expanding
that result to promises that satisfy both symmetries would be more tractable.
One of the strongest possible versions of these results could be as follows.
Conjecture 25 Let f : X → {0, 1} with X ⊆ [M ]n symmetric. Then Q(f) = Ω(R(f)1/2).
This conjecture was pointed out to me by Aaronson (personal communication). It says that a
Grover speedup is the best a quantum algorithm can achieve on a symmetric promise. There does
not seem to be a known counterexample to this conjecture.
Even more generally, we can ask the question of what kinds of symmetries suffice for exponential
quantum speedups. In other words, let G be a group action which acts on [M ]n by permuting the
indices of each element x ∈ [M ]n. For which groups G can a G-invariant promise yield a super-
polynomial quantum speedup? Shor’s algorithm demonstrates such a speedup when G is a cyclic
group. The results in this paper suggest that there may not be a speedup when G is the symmetric
group. It would be interesting to analyze this question for other groups G.
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